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This paper compares how cash and in-kind transfers affect local prices. Both types of transfers increase
the demand for normal goods, but only in-kind transfers also increase supply. Hence, in-kind transfers
should lead to lower prices than cash transfers, which helps consumers at the expense of local producers.
We test and confirm this prediction using a program in Mexico that randomly assigned villages to
receive boxes of food (trucked into the village), equivalently-valued cash transfers, or no transfers.
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A central question in anti-poverty policy is whether transfers should be made in kind
or as cash. The oft-cited rationales for in-kind transfers are to encourage consumption of
certain goods (Besley, 1988) or to induce less needy individuals to self-select out of the pro-
gram (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Besley and Coate, 1991; Bearse, Glomm, and Janeba,
2000). These potential beneﬁts of in-kind transfers are weighed against the fact that cash
transfers typically have lower administrative costs and give recipients greater freedom over
their consumption.
Another important, but less often discussed, aspect of this policy tradeoff is the effect
that in-kind and cash transfers have on local prices. Cash transfers increase the demand for
normal goods, and if supply is not perfectly elastic, the price of these goods should rise.
In-kind transfers have a corresponding cash value, so they similarly shift demand through an
income effect. But, in addition, an in-kind transfer program increases local supply. If the
government injects supply into a partially-closed economy (e.g., a village), then relative to
cash transfers, local prices should fall when transfers are provided in-kind.1
These pecuniary effects shift wealth between producers and consumers. With a cash
transfer, the price increase for normal goods hurts consumers and favors producers. With in-
kind transfers, the increase in local supply lowers prices and helps consumers at the expense
of producers. For example, a transfer of packaged food—the in-kind transfer we study in this
paper—should result in a lower price for the packaged food in the local economy, relative to
a cash transfer. If the poor are net consumers of these goods, then in-kind transfers, via their
price effect, will increase the overall transfer to the poor more than cash transfers will.
When there is perfect competition among local producers, these effects are pecuniary
externalities. However, if there is imperfect competition among local suppliers—and prices
are above the ﬁrst-best level—then the lower prices induced by in-kind transfers could also
reﬂect an increase in efﬁciency. In addition, a further effect of the lower prices is that they en-
courage consumption of the in-kind goods (for both program recipients and non-recipients);
if boosting consumption of these items was precisely the paternalistic motive for using in-
kind transfers, then the price effects will reinforce the program’s goals.
1Transfers can also take the form of vouchers, as in the U.S. Food Stamp and WIC programs. In this case
the program increases demand for certain goods but local supply is not affected. We are considering in-kind
transfers in which the government delivers the goods or services (e.g., public housing projects in the U.S., the
Head Start program), rather than providing vouchers. In addition, the type of transfer we consider is one in
which the supply is sourced from outside the economy that receives the transfer.
1Understanding the size of these price effects is especially important in developing coun-
tries, where most of the poor live in rural, often isolated villages (IFAD, 2010). In these
partially-closed economies, not characterized by the inﬁnitely elastic supply of small open
economies, large transfer programs are likely to have quantitatively important price effects.
These pecuniary effects are a potentially useful policy lever; for example, the price declines
caused by in-kind transfers can be viewed as a second-best way to tax producers and re-
distribute to consumers (Coate, Johnson, and Zeckhauser, 1994). Similarly, Coate (1989)
discusses how price effects could make an in-kind famine-relief program more effective than
a cash program, depending on the market structure. Moreover, even when the main ratio-
nale for in-kind transfers is paternalism or self-targeting and the pecuniary effects are an
unintended consequence, they might signiﬁcantly enhance or diminish the program goal of
assisting the poor.2
This paper tests for price effects of in-kind transfers versus cash transfers and compares
both to the status quo of no transfers. We study a large food assistance program for the poor
in Mexico, the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL). When rolling out the program, the
government selected around 200 villages for a village-level randomized experiment. The
poor in some of the villages received monthly in-kind transfers of packaged food (rice, veg-
etable oil, canned ﬁsh, etc.) that was trucked in by the government. The market price of
the food transfer was about 200 pesos (20 US dollars) per household per month. In other
villages, the poor households received monthly cash transfers of similar value to the in-kind
transfer. A third set of villages served as a control group. Most households in the villages,
89 percent on average, were eligible for the program.
A comparison of the cash-transfer villages to the control villages provides an estimate
of the price effect of cash transfers, which should be positive for normal goods since the
income effect shifts the demand curve outward. The in-kind transfer that we study has a
higher nominal value than the cash transfer, and its actual value to recipients is very similar
to the cash transfer; therefore, the income effect in the in-kind villages should be similar to
that in the cash villages. Thus a comparison of in-kind and cash villages isolates the supply
effect of an in-kind transfer—the change in prices caused by the inﬂux of goods into the
local economy. This supply effect should cause a decline in prices, according to the standard
2Another rationale for in-kind transfers is to insulate consumers from price volatility. The welfare effects
of insurance against price ﬂuctuations are more often discussed in the context of price stabilization policies
(Massell, 1969; Deaton, 1989; Newbery, 1989).
2demand-supply framework. This in-kind-versus-cash estimate is relevant to policy makers
deciding whether to provide transfers in kind or as cash. Using pre- and post-program data
from households and food stores in the experimental villages, we ﬁnd support for these
predictions.
Furthermore, the pecuniary effects of transfers are not restricted to just the transferred
items. A cash transfer should affect demand for all goods (there are no “transferred items”
in this case). In addition, the supply effect of an in-kind transfer should dampen demand and
lead to lower prices for goods that are substitutes of the in-kind items. The cash transfers
indeed appear to have caused an increase in overall food prices, and the in-kind transfers to
have caused a decline in prices for goods that are close substitutes of the transferred items.
The price effects we estimate are not negligible in magnitude. For the in-kind transfers,
the price effect represents an additional indirect beneﬁt for a consumer (relative to no trans-
fer) equal to 5 percent of the direct beneﬁt. For cash transfers, the price increase offsets the
direct transfer by 6 percent for a consumer. Choosing in-kind rather than cash transfers in
this setting thus generates extra indirect transfers to consumers that are worth 11 percent of
the direct transfer itself.
For a producer, these welfare effects are of course reversed. The items provided in-
kind are procured from outside the recipient villages, but households that grow crops, which
are substitutes for the in-kind goods, see the prices of their products fall. We ﬁnd that the
increase in household welfare from cash (in-kind) transfers indeed seems to be relatively
larger (smaller) for agricultural households than for non-agricultural households.
Finally, we examine how these price effects differ depending on how geographically
isolated the village is. First, isolated villages are typically less integrated with the world
economy, so local supply and demand should matter more in the determination of prices
(i.e., supply curves are steeper). Second, there is likely to be less competition on the sup-
ply side (i.e., among grocery shops) in these remote and typically smaller villages, which
can make prices more responsive to transfers. For both of these reasons, the price effects of
transfers may be more pronounced in remote villages, and we indeed see this pattern in the
data. Since poorer villages are also typically more isolated (World Bank, 1994), these ﬁnd-
ings suggest that transfer programs targeting the ultra-poor may inherently have important
pecuniary effects.
This paper is related to the literature on in-kind transfers in developed and developing
countries, which has mostly focused on the consumption effects of in-kind transfers and on
3the political economy of transfer programs. (See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a nice review
of this literature.) For example, several studies examine how the U.S. Food Stamp program
affects consumption patterns (Mofﬁtt, 1989; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009). Two studies
have examined this question for the PAL program in Mexico (Skouﬁas, Unar, and Gonzalez-
Cossio, 2008; Cunha, 2011). Other work examines whether in-kind transfers are effective
at self-targeting (Reeder, 1985; Currie and Gruber, 1996; Jacoby, 1997). Another branch of
the literature examines the political economy of in-kind programs, including their degree of
voter support and how they affect producer rents (De Janvry, Fargeix, and Sadoulet, 1991;
Jones, 1996).
Fewer studies provide evidence on the question this paper addresses, namely the price ef-
fects of in-kind transfers, and most previous studies examine voucher programs in which the
government does not act as a supplier (Murray, 1999; Finkelstein, 2007; Hastings and Wash-
ington, 2010).3 Levinsohn and McMillan (2007) use estimates of the supply and demand
elasticity of food from the literature to calculate the potential price effect of food aid, but no
paper to our knowledge measures the price effects of food aid or other in-kind programs in
developing countries.
This paper is also related to two other literatures, one on equilibrium effects of social
programs (Lise, Seitz, and Smith, 2004; Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009; Attanasio, Meghir,
and Santiago, 2009; Kaboski and Townsend, 2011) and another on price effects in isolated
markets in developing countries (Jayachandran, 2006; Donaldson, 2010).
Finally, our ﬁndings also contribute to an active area of policy debate. One of the largest
and most prominent in-kind programs worldwide, the World Food Programme, is increas-
ingly shifting toward cash transfers (World Food Programme, 2011). Meanwhile, other ma-
jor programs are moving away from cash toward in-kind transfers. For example, in the
United States much of the welfare support under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam-
ilies program is now in the form of child care, job training, and other in-kind services (Pear,
2003). Our work highlights two related lessons for policy makers choosing between cash
and in-kind transfers. First, their policy choice could have important implications for local
prices, particularly in the poorest communities. Second, the communities that have high
eligibility for transfer programs may also be the ones with less competition among local
3Murray (1999) examines the response by private suppliers in a market where the government does provide
supply, U.S. public housing. Finkelstein (2007) ﬁnds that the Medicare program caused healthcare prices to
rise, and Hastings and Washington (2010) ﬁnd that grocery stores in the U.S. set prices higher at the time of
the month when demand from Food Stamp recipients is higher.
4suppliers; in this case, changes in local prices are not just pecuniary externalities, but have
efﬁciency implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical
predictions. Section 3 describes Mexico’s PAL program and our data. Section 4 presents the
empirical strategy and results. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2. Conceptual Framework
In this section, we use a basic supply and demand framework to discuss how cash and in-
kind transfers should affect prices. We do not present a formal model but instead informally
derive the predictions that we take to the data.
We begin by describing the case where local suppliers are perfectly competitive (and then
discussimperfectcompetitionbelow). Inasmallopeneconomy, changesinthelocaldemand
or supply should have no effect on prices since supply is inﬁnitely elastic (horizontal supply
curve) with prices set at the world level. However, the rural villages that are our focus are
more typically partially-closed economies in which prices depend on local conditions. When
the supply curve is positively sloped, shifts in the demand for or supply of a good will affect
its price (as well as those of substitutes and complements).
In our empirical application, an economy is a Mexican village, and the main goods we
examine are packaged foods. The local suppliers are shopkeepers in the village, and they
procure the items from outside the village. In effect, we are focusing on the short-run equi-
librium of the market, where we assume that local suppliers cannot adjust capacity instan-
taneously and procuring more supply entails increasing marginal costs. The remoteness of
the villages (i.e., high transportation costs to other markets) is one reason that inventory in
local stores is unlikely to adjust instantaneously; for example, to meet higher demand, a
shopkeeper might need to travel to a neighboring village to buy supply from a shop there.4
In the long run, one might expect the supply curve to be ﬂatter; at the end of the section, we
discuss in more detail how the market would likely adjust in the longer run.
Figure 1 depicts the market for a normal good in a village. The ﬁgure shows the effect of
acashtransfer: Thedemandcurveshiftstotherightviaanincomeeffect, andtheequilibrium
price, p, increases.5 Denoting the amount of money transferred in cash by XCash, our ﬁrst
4In our qualitative interviews of shopkeepers in the program villages, they reported that they meet unex-
pected demand by traveling to a neighboring village or town to buy goods.
5For inferior goods, demand will shift to the left with the opposite price effect. In related ongoing work, we
formally estimate the income elasticities of the goods in our data and our results suggest that food items in our




In-kind transfers also generate an income effect, so demand will again shift to the right.
We deﬁne the in-kind transfer amount XInKind in terms of its equivalent cash value.6 Thus
the demand shift caused by a transfer amount X is by deﬁnition the same for either form of
transfer. With an in-kind transfer, however, there is also a shift in the supply curve. For a
transferred good, supply shifts to the right by the quantity added to the local economy, as
shown in Figure 2. While the net price effect of an in-kind transfer relative to the original
market equilibrium is, in general, theoretically ambiguous, one can sign the price effect of








In our empirical application, we examine the predictions above in two ways. First, we
compare villages that received different forms of transfers (extensive margin) and, second,
for Prediction (2) only, we also compare different goods that were transferred in-kind in
larger versus smaller amounts (intensive margin).
Imperfect competition
Predictions (1) and (2) can also hold in the case of imperfect competition. To see this
graphically, it is helpful to depict just the quantity demanded from local suppliers. Cash
and in-kind transfers have an income effect that shifts demand to the right. The additional
supply effect of an in-kind transfer is equivalent to a reduction in the demand facing local
suppliers, since a portion of consumer demand is now met by the government transfer. Thus,
sample are by and large normal goods. See also Attanasio, DiMaro, Lechene, and Phillips (2009) for evidence
from Mexico that food items are typically normal goods.
6If either the transfer is inframarginal (that is, it is less than the household would have consumed had it
received the transfer in cash, valued at the market prices) or resale is costless, the cash value of the transferred
goods is simply the market value. If, instead, the transfer is “extramarginal” and resale is costly, then the
extramarginal quantity would be valued at between the market price and the resale price. Note that if this latter
case pertained (costly resale), then the effective supply inﬂux into the economy from an in-kind transfer would
be the actual inﬂux net of any extramarginal transfers that are consumed.
7For many standard classes of preferences, such as homothetic preferences, prices are predicted to decline
with an in-kind transfer relative to no transfer. For the price to increase, an in-kind transfer of a good with
aggregate value X would need to increase aggregate demand for the good by more than X; in other words, the
good would have to be a strong luxury good.
6an in-kind transfer entails an income effect (demand shifts to the right) and a supply effect
(demand shifts back to the left), so a smaller total demand shift than a cash transfer (see
Appendix Figure 1).8
To assess how the price effects vary with the degree of competition, consider a Cournot-
Nash model with N ﬁrms that have constant marginal cost c and face linear demand p =
d  Q: The equilibrium price is p = (d +Nc)=(N +1): Suppose the transfer changes the
amount demanded from the local ﬁrms by an amount Dd; Dd is positive for a cash transfer
and negative or less positive for an in-kind transfer. Then the change in price is given by
Dp=p = Dd=(d +Nc); which has the property that the higher N is (more competition), the
smaller the magnitude of the price effects.
More generally, the price effects under imperfect competition depend on the shape of the
demand curve.9 Appendix A presents a Cournot model with a generalized demand function
and shows conditions under which an increase in demand leads to a higher price. A sufﬁcient
conditionisadownward-slopingdemandcurvewherethetransfersrepresentanadditiveshift
in demand. We then have the following comparative statics for how the price effects vary















The higher N is (more competition) the smaller the price effect of a demand shift.
While the comparative statics may be the same with perfect or imperfect competition,
the efﬁciency implications differ. If lack of competition causes prices to be above their
efﬁcient level, then in-kind transfers can increase total surplus (assuming that there are
not inherent production inefﬁciencies in the government sector). Less consumer demand
is met inefﬁciently by the local suppliers because part of the demand is now met by the
welfare-maximizing (not proﬁt-maximizing) government. Another difference is that even
if the marginal costs are constant, with imperfect competition, shifts in demand can affect
8Another potential response to the program is that ﬁrms might change their degree of price discrimination.
In our qualitative interviews with shopkeepers, we found that surprisingly few engage in price discrimination.
Most use posted prices and do not vary the price for different customers.
9For example, if the program causes a multiplicative shift in demand, then there would be no effect on prices
in the standard Cournot model (Cowan, 2004). In other cases, an increase in demand can cause oligopolistic
prices to fall; greater competition would still dampen the magnitude of the price effects.
7prices. Thus, even in the long run, the price effects would likely persist.
Openness of the economy
Returning to the benchmark competitive case, another testable comparative static is that
the more inelastic supply is (i.e., the steeper the supply curve is or the lower the elasticity,
hS, is), the more prices will respond to shifts in supply and demand. One factor affecting
the elasticity of supply is the degree of openness of the local economy. For example, in our
setting, if a shopkeeper responds to an increase in demand by obtaining extra supply from a
neighboring village, then the more remote the location of the village, the higher the marginal
cost of procuring additional supply, or the steeper the supply curve (see Appendix Figure 2).
For a cash transfer, when the demand curve shifts to the right, the price increase should




Comparing in-kind to cash transfers, the (relative) price response should be smaller in mag-











For an in-kind transfer relative to no transfer, the net effect of the income and supply effects
is ambiguous as discussed above, but the magnitude of the net effect will be smaller in more
open economies.
In our empirical analysis, to test both the predictions about imperfect competition and
about openness, we compare more geographically isolated villages (longer travel time to
larger markets) to less isolated villages. Geographic isolation is our proxy for both how
closed an economy is (lower hS) and for how uncompetitive the market is (lower N).
Goods not in the transferred bundle
There are also price effects for goods not in the in-kind bundle. With cash transfers,
demand and prices for all normal goods should increase. Using the superscript NX to denote




8With in-kind transfers, the inﬂux of supply for certain goods will affect the demand for
and prices of substitutes and complements. If the price of the transferred good falls, then
demand for its complements should increase and demand for its substitutes should fall. Let
DNX be the demand for a non-transferred good, which is a function of the price p of the
transferred good (among other prices and factors). We can deﬁne the cross-price elasticity
for a non-transferred good with respect to the transferred good as hNX
D 
¶ lnDNX(p)
¶ lnp . If a good
is a substitute (complement) for the transferred goods, then hNX
D is positive (negative).10 The
prediction is that demand for substitutes—and hence their price—should decrease under an












The above are the main testable implications we take to the data. We now discuss some
of the assumptions above in the context of the program we study.
Assumption of identical income effects for cash and in-kind transfers
Above we deﬁne the in-kind transfer amount as its cash equivalent, so the income effect
is the same for a cash and in-kind transfer. In our setting, the Mexican government set the
cash transfer equal to its wholesale cost of procuring the in-kind goods, which was about
27 percent lower than the cost at consumer prices. (The cash transfer was 150 pesos per
month, but the market value of the in-kind transfer in the recipient villages averaged 206
pesos.) Therefore, the in-kind bundle would have a higher cash-equivalent value than the
cash transfer if the transfer was inframarginal to consumption or resale was costless, i.e.,
the in-kind nature of the transfers did not distort recipients’ consumption choices. However,
some of the transfers were in fact binding on consumption patterns.
Cunha (2011) ﬁnds that for some of the transferred goods, the transfer was larger than
counterfactual consumption under a cash transfer. In total, 90 pesos of the in-kind transfer
were “extramarginal,” and recipients consumed an extra 35 pesos’ worth of these goods. If
consumers valued the extramarginal consumption at half its market value, the deadweight
loss would be 17.5 pesos. Not all of the extramarginal transfer was binding on consumption;
the remaining 55 pesos (90 - 35) of goods were presumably resold. If the transaction costs
of resale eroded half the value, this represents 27.5 pesos of loss. Thus, under these rough
10When a bundle of goods is transferred, the cross-price elasticity would be treating the bundle as a single
aggregate good with a single aggregate price.
9assumptions, the in-kind transfer was worth 161 pesos (206 - 17.5 - 27.5).11
Inshort, whileitisdifﬁculttopinpointtheprecisevalueofanin-kindtransfertorecipients—
its nominal value minus the deadweight loss relative to an unconstrained transfer—the value
of the in-kind transfer was likely quite similar to but somewhat larger than the value of the
cash transfer to which we compare it. This extra income effect for the in-kind transfer (161-
150 = 11 pesos per month) will bias us against ﬁnding a price decline for in-kind transfers
relative to cash transfers.
Another consideration is that the effect of government transfers on demand might differ
from the standard income elasticity of demand. There might be a ﬂypaper effect whereby a
cashtransferlabeledasfoodassistancestimulatesthedemandforfoodmorethanagenerically-
labeled transfer would have. This type of effect is likely especially strong when transfers are
made in-kind: by giving households particular goods, the government might signal the high
quality of these goods (e.g., their nutritional value) and also make these items more salient
to households. In other words, with an in-kind transfer relative to a cash transfer, not just
the supply but also the demand for the transferred goods might increase. This extra effect
of in-kind transfers would counteract the result given in (2), and the magnitude we estimate
would then represent a lower bound for the pure supply-shift effect of in-kind transfers.
Supply side of the local economy
In our setting, the items in the in-kind bundle are packaged foods that are produced
industrially in urban areas. The local supply side of the market comprises small stores within
the program villages that stock these packaged foods plus other food products and sundry
items.12 Small villages typically have one to six of these types of stores.13 Note that when
we examine effects on substitute goods—other food items that were not transferred in the
bundle—some of these substitutes are produced locally (e.g. vegetables).
11Householdsmightalsostorethegoods, butsincetheprogramisexpectedtocontinueindeﬁnitely, perpetual
storage and an accumulating amount of stored goods seems unlikely. In any case, there would also be some
deadweight loss from storage.
12There is also a supply side of the market that is outside the local economy, namely the packaged food
manufacturers. If by increasing the total demand from food manufacturers, the government is driving up
manufacturers’ marginal cost (because they have decreasing returns to scale), then there would also be Mexico-
wide price effects of the program. These effects would be very small since the program households represent
less than 1 percent of Mexican households, but these small effects would apply to many people. Our focus is
the price effects within the villages that receive the program; we examine only the local general equilibrium
effects in the recipient villages, and not the total general equilibrium effect of the program.
13The distributors that truck supplies into the village are another type of supplier. They often have market
power, so they may be the source of imperfect competition and the effective price setter in some cases.
10In the long run, local supply could react to the transfer program. Sellers could scale back
their procurement of the food items in the transferred bundle, or local food producers could
cut back production. In the short run, there is limited scope for this adjustment unless the
suppliers anticipate the policy. In the longer term, it is possible that the price effects would
diminish as local supply adjusts.14 Since the goods in our setting are mainly storable (e.g.,
vegetable oil, rice), even in the short run, shopkeepers might be able to adjust supply by
allowing inventory to build up. In treating the short-run market as a spot market, the implicit
assumption is that inventory costs are high. One potential reason for high inventory costs is
that shopkeepers are credit constrained and have limited working capital. Other factors cited
by shopkeepers in our qualitative ﬁeldwork were the risk of theft or damage to inventory and
limited storage capacity.
3. Description of the PAL Program and Data
3.1 PAL program and experiment
We study the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL) in Mexico. Started in 2004, PAL
operates in about 5,000 very poor, rural villages throughout Mexico. Villages are eligible to
receive PAL if they have fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, are highly marginalized as classiﬁed
by the Census Bureau, and do not receive aid from either Liconsa, the Mexican subsidized
milk program, or Oportunidades, the conditional cash transfer program (formerly known
as Progresa). Therefore PAL villages are typically poorer and more rural than the widely-
studied Progresa/Oportunidades villages.15 Households within program villages are eligible
to receive transfers if they are classiﬁed as poor by the national government.
PAL provides a monthly in-kind allotment consisting of seven basic items (corn ﬂour,
rice, beans, pasta, biscuits (cookies), fortiﬁed powdered milk, and vegetable oil) and two to
four supplementary items (including canned tuna ﬁsh, canned sardines, lentils, corn starch,
chocolate powder, and packaged breakfast cereal). All of the items are common Mexican
brands and are typically available in local food shops. The basic goods are dietary staples
for poor households in Mexico. The supplementary goods are foods typically consumed by
14According to the program administrators, the start of the PAL program was a surprise to the local commu-
nities (private communication). Note that another potential long-run impact is that the market structure could
change in response to the program, with stores going out of business or new stores opening.
15Villages could be “too poor” to receive Progresa/Oportunidades because a requirement was that they had
the capacity to meet the extra demand for prenatal visits and school attendance induced by the program; villages
that lacked adequate health facilities, for example, were ineligible for Progresa/Oportunidades.
11fewer households in a village or less frequently; one goal of the program was to encourage
households to add diversity to their diet and consume more of these goods.16
PAL is administered by the public/private agency, Diconsa. The Diconsa agency also
maintains subsidized grocery shops in some villages (38 percent of the villages in our sam-
ple), which are run by a resident of the village. Diconsa stores have latitude to set their own
prices, but less latitude than privately-owned stores. The government provides suggested
prices to Diconsa store operators; the Diconsa stores are not obliged to use the suggested
prices, but they must maintain prices that are 3 to 7 percent lower than market prices. Thus,
prices at these stores should be responsive to market conditions, but to a lesser degree than
fully private stores.17
Concurrent with the national roll-out of the program, 208 villages in southern Mexico
were randomly selected for inclusion in an experiment.18 The randomization was at the
village level, with eligible households in experimental villages receiving either (i) a monthly
in-kind food transfer (50 percent of villages), (ii) a 150 peso per month cash transfer (25
percent of villages), or (iii) nothing, i.e., the control group (the remaining 25 percent of
villages).19 About 89 percent of households in the in-kind and cash villages were eligible to
receive transfers (and received them). A woman (the household head or spouse of the head)
was designated the beneﬁciary within the household, if possible.
TheimpactofthePALprogramonvillageconsumptionwaslarge, bothbecausethe eligi-
bility rate was high and because the transfer per household was sizeable. The in-kind transfer
represented 18 percent of a recipient household’s baseline food expenditures on average and
11 percent of total expenditures. Including the ineligible households, the injection of food
into the village through the program was equivalent to 16 percent of baseline aggregate food
expenditures and 11 percent of total expenditures. Similarly, the cash transfer represented an
8 percent increase in total village income.
16Appendix Figures 4 to 7 show the PAL box, a truck transporting the boxes to a village, the unloading of
the boxes in the village, and examples of the grocery shops in the villages.
17Diconsa stores receive a government subsidy to cover transportation costs. Unlike fully private shops, they
do not allow purchases on credit. After our study period, the government changed the discount that Diconsa
stores are supposed to offer to 20 percent (private communication with program administrators).
18The experiment was implemented in eight states: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo,
Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatan. See Appendix Figure 3 for the locations of the experimental villages.
19The rationale for having a larger in-kind treatment arm was that there was an orthogonal randomization
among the in-kind villages under which half were provided nutrition education classes. We abstract from this
component of the experiment in our analysis because a substantial fraction of the villages that should have been
excluded from the nutritional classes received them (for details see Cunha (2011)).
12In the in-kind experimental villages, the transfer comprised the seven basic items and
three supplementary goods: lentils, breakfast cereal, and either canned tuna ﬁsh or canned
sardines. However, there is some ambiguity about whether the in-kind villages always re-
ceived these three supplementary items. Thus, in our analysis, we separate the basic PAL
goods from the supplementary ones. A second reason to examine the basic goods separately
is that they isolate the simple income and supply effects of in-kind transfers; if the gov-
ernment succeeded in increasing households’ taste for the supplementary goods, then the
supplementary goods would have an additional effect of changing preferences (that goes in
the direction of increasing demand and prices).
Of the 208 villages, 14 are excluded from the analysis. Eight villages do not have follow-
up price data; in two villages, the PAL program began before the baseline survey; two vil-
lages are geographically contiguous and cannot be regarded as separate villages/economies;
and two villages were deemed ineligible for the experiment because they were receiving the
conditional cash program, Oportunidades, contrary to PAL regulations. Observable charac-
teristics of the excluded villages are balanced across treatment arms. (Results available upon
request.) Of the remaining 194 villages, three received the wrong treatment (one in-kind vil-
lage did not receive the program, one cash village received both in-kind and cash transfers,
and one control village received in-kind transfers). We include these villages and interpret
our estimates as intent-to-treat estimates.
Both the in-kind and cash transfers were, in practice, delivered bimonthly, two monthly
allotments at a time per household. The transfer size was the same for every eligible house-
hold regardless of family size. Resale of in-kind food transfers was not prohibited, nor were
there purchase requirements attached to the cash transfers. As mentioned above, the monthly
box of food had a market value of about 206 pesos in the program villages, and the cash
transfer was 150 pesos per month, based on the government’s wholesale cost of procuring
the in-kind items.20
The items included in the in-kind transfer are not produced locally.21 Thus, the main
20The government should have included its transportation and administrative costs when calculating the
in-kind program’s costs. This oversight attenuates the in-kind-versus-cash price differential that is our main
focus; a 206 peso cash transfer would have led to a larger price increase in cash villages, so a larger relative
price decline in in-kind villages.
21We do not observe actual food production, but rather draw this conclusion from household survey data
on consumption of own-produced foods. The only PAL good that has auto-consumption in any appreciable
quantity is beans (10 percent of households consume own-produced beans at baseline). There is also relatively
little auto-consumption of non-PAL foods. Only 7 out 60 foods in our analysis have more than 10 percent of the
population producing the good, the largest of which is corn kernels, which 27 percent of households produce.
13welfare effects on the producer side of the market will be felt by shopkeepers. There will also
be welfare effects for local producers in cases where there is a high degree of substitutability
(or complementarity) between the in-kind goods and the local products.
3.2 Data
The data for our analysis come from surveys of stores and households conducted in the
experimental villages by the Mexican National Institute of Health both before and after the
program was introduced. Baseline data were collected in the ﬁnal quarter of 2003 and the
ﬁrst quarter of 2004, before villagers knew they would be receiving the program. Follow-up
data were collected two years later in the ﬁnal quarter of 2005, about one year after PAL
transfers began in these villages.
Our measure of post-program prices comes from a survey of local food stores. Enumer-
ators collected prices for ﬁxed quantities of 66 individual food items, from a maximum of
three stores per village, though typically data were collected from one or two stores per vil-
lage.22 Some of the stores surveyed were part of the Diconsa agency (21 percent) while the
majority were independent stores (79 percent).
We also use measures of pre-program food prices. Unfortunately, the baseline data col-
lectionon storeprices wasincomplete. Datawere collectedfor only40of thefood items, and
among these, there is extensive missing data. Therefore, we use the household survey to con-
struct the pre-program unit value (expenditure divided by quantity purchased) for each food
item and take the village median unit value as our measure of price. In each village, a ran-
dom sample of 33 households was interviewed about purchase quantities and expenditures
on 60 food items.23 Unlike the post-program prices where we have multiple observations per
village-good (one for each store-good), the pre-program prices do not vary within a village.
22Most of the shops had posted prices. If prices were not posted, the enumerators were instructed to choose
the lowest price available for a given good in order to maintain consistency. The data for prices that were
not posted is likely noisier, but this applies to all of the treatment arms so should reduce the precision of the
estimates but should not change the coefﬁcients.
23Unit values are observed for households that purchased the good in the past seven days. We do not use unit
values for post-program prices because the program changes the number and composition of households that
purchase items. (Results available upon request.) If the quality of a good does not vary, then unit values could
still be used as a proxy for post-program prices; however, if quality varies, then treatment effects estimated with
post-program unit values would reﬂect changes in both price and quality. While quality is quite homogenous
for manufactured items where there are few brands sold, it is heterogeneous for other goods (e.g., fresh food).
See also McKelvey (2011) on the effect of income and price changes on the interpretation of unit values. Note
also that for some goods, there are very few household-level observations of the baseline unit value (e.g., lentils,
cereal, corn ﬂour), while for others, most households purchased the good (e.g., beans, corn kernels, onions).
The noisiness of our pre-period price measure will vary with the number of observed unit values.
14In cases where the pre-program village median unit value is missing, we impute the price
using the median price in other villages within the same municipality (or within the same
state in the few cases where there are no data for other villages in the municipality).
We exclude some food items from the analysis due to missing data. Among the PAL
goods, the store price survey did not include biscuits; for the non-PAL items, chocolate
powder, nixtamalized corn ﬂour, salt, and non-fortiﬁed powdered milk were not included in
the household survey and corn starch was not included in the store survey.24 Finally, two
pairs of goods were asked about jointly in the household survey (beef/pork and canned ﬁsh)
but separately in the store survey (beef, pork, canned tuna, canned sardines). To address this
discrepancy, we use the aggregated category and take the median across all observed store
prices for either good as our post-program price measure. Our ﬁnal data set contains 6 basic
PAL goods (corn ﬂour, rice, beans, pasta, oil, fortiﬁed milk), 3 supplementary PAL goods
(cannedﬁsh, packagedbreakfastcereal, andlentils), and51non-PALgoods. AppendixTable
1 lists all of the goods used in our analysis.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the PAL goods. Column 2 shows the quan-
tity per good of the monthly household transfer, and column 3 shows its monetary value
measured using our pre-program measure of prices. Column 4 presents each good’s share
of the total calories in the transfer bundle. As can be seen, the supplementary items were
transferred in smaller amounts with lower value and fewer calories than the basic goods.
There is considerable variation across the PAL goods in the size of the aggregate village-
level transfer. One measure of the size of this supply shift is listed in column 5. Here, the
villagechangeinsupply, DSupply, isconstructedastheaverageacrossin-kindvillagesofthe
total amount of a good transferred to the village (i.e., average number of eligible households
pervillagetimesallotmentperhousehold)divided bytheaverageconsumptionofthegoodin
control villages in the post-program period. For example, there was almost exactly as much
corn ﬂour delivered to the villages each month as would have been consumed absent the
program (DSupply = 1:00 for corn ﬂour), while there was over eight times as much fortiﬁed
powdered milk delivered as would have been consumed absent the program (DSupply=8:62
for fortiﬁed milk powder). We use this DSupply measure, which we discuss in more detail in
the following section, to test for effects along the “intensive margin” of the in-kind program.
Our ﬁnal data set contains 360 stores in 194 villages and 12,940 good-village-store ob-
24Thepriceofbiscuitswasintendedtobecollected, butamistakeinthesurveyquestionnaireledenumerators
to collect prices for crackers (“galletas saladas” in Spanish) rather than for biscuits (“galletas” in Spanish).
15servations. The number of goods varies by store since many stores sell only a subset of
goods. Table 2 presents summary statistics by treatment group. The comparison of baseline
characteristics across treatment groups suggests that the randomization was successful; the
baseline characteristics are for the most part indistinguishable across groups. For three vari-
ables, there are signiﬁcant differences across groups: The presence of a Diconsa store differs
between control and in-kind; the share of producer households differs between control and
cash and between in-kind and cash; and farm revenues differs between control and cash and
between control and in-kind. For our primary comparison—between the cash and in-kind
treatments—only one variable is unbalanced at baseline (and with a p-value above 0.05).
In some of our auxiliary analyses, we use household-level data to either construct village-
level variables or to estimate household-level regressions. For example, we calculate the
median household expenditures per capita in a village at baseline as a measure of the income
level in the village. Also, when we test for heterogeneous welfare effects for households
that produce agricultural goods, we use household-level outcomes such as farm proﬁts and
expenditures per capita. We present more detail on the relevant data as we introduce each
analysis in the next section.
Note that the data collection was designed to measure the PAL program’s impact on
food consumption, not its general equilibrium effects. Therefore some data that ideally we
would have are unavailable, e.g., the number of grocery shops in a village. We conducted
follow-up qualitative ﬁeldwork in 2011 in 16 of the program villages (see Appendix B for
further details), interviewing several shopkeepers per village, in order to better understand
the market structure and the price-setting behavior of grocery shops. We did not collect
retrospective quantitative data, as we found that respondents could not reliably remember
details about the market structure from eight years before.
4. Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Price effects of in-kind transfers and cash transfers
Our analysis treats each village as a local economy and examines food prices as the out-
come, using variation across villages in whether a village was randomly assigned to in-kind
transfers, cash transfers, or no transfers. We begin by focusing on the food items included
in the in-kind program. Our ﬁrst prediction is that prices will be higher in cash villages rela-
tive to control villages since a positive income shock shifts the demand curve out (under the
assumption that the items are normal goods). The second prediction is that relative to cash
16villages, prices will be lower in in-kind villages because of the supply inﬂux.
We estimate the following regression where the outcome variable is lnpgsv, the log price
for good g at store s in village v.
lnpgsv = a +b1InKindv+b2Cashv+f lnpgv;t 1+sIgv+egsv (9)
Ourtwopredictionscorrespondto b2 >0(cashtransfersincreaseprices), andb1 <b2 (prices
are lower under in-kind transfers than cash transfers). The regression pools the effects for
the different PAL food items; to adjust for the different price levels of different goods, and
more generally to improve the precision of the estimates, we control for the baseline log
price, denoted lnpgv;t 1. (The subscript t  1 is shorthand for the variable being constructed
from the baseline data; the estimation sample is cross-sectional, not a panel over time.)
The variable I is a dummy variable for whether the pre-program price is imputed from the
municipality or state because the village median unit value is missing. We cluster standard
errors at the village level, the level at which the treatment was randomized.
Table 3, column 1, presents the main speciﬁcation using the basic PAL goods. (See Ap-
pendix Table 2 for the results separately for each PAL good.) For cash villages, the point
estimate suggests that the transfer program caused prices to increase by 3.9 percent ( b b2),
though the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. In in-kind villages, prices fell by 5.5
percent relative to the cash villages ( b b1  b b2), with a p-value of 0.01; the bottom of the table
reports the difference between the in-kind and cash coefﬁcients and the statistical signiﬁ-
cance of this difference. As mentioned above, theory is ambiguous about whether the supply
or demand effect is bigger in magnitude, but for most standard classes of preferences, the
supply effect should dominate. Empirically we ﬁnd that the supply effect (in-kind coefﬁcient
minus cash coefﬁcient) is about 50 percent larger in magnitude than the income effect (cash
coefﬁcient), and thus the net effect of the in-kind transfer on prices is negative.
In column 2 we include the supplementary PAL goods. The fact that canned ﬁsh, cereal,
and lentils may not have been the supplementary goods in some experimental villages should
not affect the cash or control villages but might attenuate our estimates of the in-kind-versus-
cash effect. In addition, there is low consumption at baseline for the supplementary goods,
and for very thin markets, prices are noisier and the neoclassical model might not ﬁt as well.
We ﬁnd an in-kind-versus-cash coefﬁcient that is somewhat smaller in magnitude when we
include the supplementary goods (magnitude of -0.044 with a p-value of 0.04). The fact that
17the price decline in in-kind versus cash villages is smaller for the supplementary goods is
also consistent with the program having any additional effect of increasing households’ taste
for the supplementary in-kind goods.
As described in the previous section, the public/private Diconsa stores could adjust prices
accordingtomarketconditionsbutwithsomerestrictions. Thus, oneexpectsthepriceeffects
to be stronger for the fully private stores than for the full sample of stores. Columns 3 and
4 estimate equation (9) for the subsample of non-Diconsa stores. We ﬁnd that the positive
effect of cash transfers is somewhat larger in this subsample (and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level for basic PAL goods); private stores seem to raise prices more than Diconsa stores when
demand goes up. The in-kind-versus-cash effect is similar in magnitude to the full sample.
As shown in columns 5 and 6, when we use the full sample and estimate interaction effects
for the Diconsa stores, we cannot reject that the Diconsa stores have the same price responses
to the transfer programs as non-Diconsa stores.
4.2 Robustness of the main results
The results above indicate that relative to cash transfers, in-kind transfers lead to signiﬁ-
cantly lower prices. The point estimates suggest a net negative effect of in-kind transfers on
prices and a positive effect of cash transfers on prices. Table 4 presents a series of robust-
ness checks of these main results. (Appendix Table 3 reports these robustness checks for the
subsample of non-Diconsa stores.)
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 we estimate a ﬁrst-differences model. The coefﬁcient
on the lagged price in Table 3 was 0.86 and statistically less than 1, but the estimate is
consistent with a true coefﬁcient of 1 that is downward biased due to measurement error:
A rough calculation of attenuation bias suggests that the coefﬁcient on the lagged price is
downward biased by a factor of 0.84.25 This suggests that the true coefﬁcient is 1, in which
case a preferred speciﬁcation might be to estimate the model in ﬁrst differences, comparing
before and after the program. Since our treatment variables are equal to zero in the pre-
period, a model in ﬁrst differences is equivalent to using the after-minus-before change in
log prices (denoted Dlnpgsv) as the outcome variable.
Dlnpgsv = a +b1InKindv+b2Cashv+sIgv+egsv (10)
25This calculation uses the between-village variation in baseline unit values for a good, which is 0.129, as
the estimate of the actual variance (signal) and the within-village variance in prices for a good, which is 0.024,
as the estimate of measurement error (noise). The attenuation factor is thus 0:129=(0:129+0:024) = 0:84:
18These results are somewhat larger in magnitude than the ones in Table 3, but are generally
quite similar.
Incolumns3and4ofTable4, weuseanalternativefunctionalformforthepricevariable.
The theoretical predictions are for price levels, but we use a log speciﬁcation as our main
speciﬁcation so that we can pool goods with different price levels; if one good is ten times the
price of another good, we would not expect the program to have the same effect in levels for
these two goods, but we would expect it to have the same proportional effect, all else equal.
An alternative way to enable an apples-to-apples comparison across goods is to normalize
the price for each good so that all the goods have the same mean price. Thus, columns 3
and 4 show estimates from a version of equation (9) that uses normalized prices constructed
as level prices divided by the average price for the good in the control group villages. (The
results are nearly identical if we use the mean value across all the villages.) As can be
seen, the results are similar to our main speciﬁcation. The net negative effect of the in-kind
transfer for the basic PAL goods is -0.033 (3.3 percent decline in prices) and signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. The in-kind-versus-cash effect (4.8 percent) is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. The cash effect (1.5 percent) is positive but insigniﬁcant.
In columns 5 and 6, we include good ﬁxed effects and ﬁnd a similar in-kind-versus-cash
point estimate, though the coefﬁcient difference loses signiﬁcance in column 6 when the
supplementary goods are included; the cash coefﬁcient, which is imprecisely estimated in
most of the speciﬁcations, is negative but insigniﬁcant in column 6. Finally, columns 7 and
8 use only the post-program data and do not control for baseline prices. These estimates are
considerably noisier than our main estimates but follow similar patterns.
In short, our ﬁnding that the inﬂux of supply from in-kind transfers causes prices to fall
relative to prices under cash transfers is robust to several alternative speciﬁcations. We also
consistently ﬁnd point estimates suggesting that in-kind transfers have a net negative effect
on prices, and we generally ﬁnd that cash transfers cause price inﬂation.
4.3 Using variation in the size of the supply inﬂux
A larger inﬂux of supply will cause a larger fall in the price, all else equal. In our setting,
the supply shift associated with each good in the PAL basket varied in magnitude. Some of
the goods were provided in large quantity, measured relative to the baseline market size (e.g.,
powdered milk) whereas for other goods, a small quantity was transferred (e.g., vegetable
oil). We can thus also examine variation across goods in the intensity of treatment.
We quantify the size of the supply shift as the average across all in-kind villages of the
19total amount of good g transferred to the village divided by the average consumption of
the good in control villages in the post-period.26 We use consumption in the control vil-
lages in the post-period as a proxy for the equilibrium market size for the good, absent
the program (using pre-program consumption in in-kind villages or in all villages gives
similar results). This normalization gives us a measure of the supply shock that is rel-
ative to the market size. For each good, the intensity of the treatment is measured as
DSupplyg  InKindAmountg=TotalMarketSizeg; as reported in Table 1, column 5. Using
this measure of the size of the in-kind transfer by good, we can test whether the price effects
vary by good accordingly.
The variable DSupply measures the intensity of the in-kind treatment, and there is no a
priori reason that the effects of the cash treatment will vary with it. Thus, in principle, we
could compare the in-kind villages to the pooled cash and control villages. However, since
the income effect could be spuriously correlated with DSupply, we again compare in-kind
villages to cash-transfer villages. We set DSupply equal to the same value in all villages and
construct an interaction term for each of the treatment arms. Thus, we estimate the following
equation.
lnpgsv = a +q1DSupplygInKindv+q2DSupplygCashv
+b1InKindv+b2Cashv+rDSupplyg+f lnpgv;t 1+sIgv+egsv (11)
The prediction is that q1 < q2, or that the larger the supply shock, the more prices fall in
in-kind versus cash villages.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show the results on treatment intensity. The point estimate
of interest is the difference in the coefﬁcients for DSupplyInKind and DSupplyCash.
This difference of -0.033 (shown in the bottom rows of the table) suggests that the larger
the supply shock, the bigger the price decline, consistent with the prediction. The magni-
tude implies that when the supply shock increases in size by 10 percentage points measured
relative to the baseline market size, the price falls by 0.33 percent more in in-kind villages
relative to cash villages. When we expand the sample to include the supplementary PAL
goods (column 2), the estimated effect remains negative and similar in magnitude, but is no
26There is also between-village variation in the size of the transfer; villages differ in their baseline consump-
tion of goods and the proportion of households that are program-eligible. We average across villages because
of the endogeneity of this between-village variation (for example, it depends on the village’s poverty and its
taste for a good).
20longer signiﬁcant.27
These results using DSupply are identiﬁed off of a different source of variation than the
earlier results using the treatment indicators. Here we are examining the intensive margin
of treatment across goods, whereas earlier we examined the extensive margin of treatment
across villages. We ﬁnd it reassuring that the hypotheses about the price effects of in-kind
versus cash transfers are conﬁrmed in two independent ways.
4.4 Substitute goods
Effects on close substitutes of PAL foods
We next test predictions related to substitute goods. We ﬁrst look at goods that are espe-
cially substitutable with the PAL foods. We must consider substitutability with the aggregate
bundle since there are no instances where, say, vegetable oil is transferred but corn ﬂour is
not. The larger in magnitude the cross-price elasticity of a good is with one of the PAL items
and the more of that PAL item that is transferred through the program, the more the price of
the substitute good should fall.
To construct a set of hypothesized close substitutes, we ﬁrst identiﬁed corn ﬂour, fortiﬁed
powdered milk, biscuits, and pasta soup as goods that were transferred in large and extra-
marginal quantities by the PAL program. We then classiﬁed the following goods as their
close substitutes: corn grain, corn tortillas, liquid milk, cheese, yogurt, potatoes, and plan-
tains. We made the classiﬁcation based on our understanding of diets in Mexican villages
and veriﬁed the classiﬁcation with Mexican colleagues.
Column 3 of Table 5 examines the price effects for the close substitutes. As expected,
for goods that the in-kind allotment should crowd out, we ﬁnd a price decline in in-kind
villages. The in-kind-versus-cash effect is -0.073 and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. It is
surprising that this effect of 7.3 percent is larger than the effect of 5.5 percent for the PAL
goods (though they are not statistically distinguishable). One possible explanation, though
it is speculative, is the effect on preferences mentioned earlier: If the government transfer
made salient the PAL goods or signaled their nutritional quality, then the in-kind transfer
might have boosted demand for the PAL goods in addition to increasing their supply in the
27There is no theoretical prediction on DSupplyCash, which measures how the income effect varies by
good, but we ﬁnd a positive coefﬁcient. The in-kind transfers are, by deﬁnition, large relative to the market
size (high DSupply) when a good is not a staple but is instead less common in the diet, e.g., lentils, breakfast
cereal, fortiﬁed milk; these non-staples are very likely luxury goods with a high income elasticity. The main
effect of DSupply suggests that prices, by happenstance, were increasing over time more for the goods that
were transferred in larger amounts by PAL.
21village.
Effects on all non-PAL food items
We next examine all of the non-PAL food items in our data. By and large, other food
items are substitutes for the PAL bundle, so non-PAL food prices are predicted to fall in
in-kind villages relative to cash villages. (The price of non-food items, which should not be
close substitutes with the PAL bundle, should respond less; unfortunately, the prices of non-
food items are not available to test this prediction.) The point estimate in Table 5, column
4 suggests that such a relative price decline in in-kind villages occurred. This coefﬁcient
difference of 1.7 percent is smaller in magnitude than we found for the PAL goods or the
close substitutes, as expected. The estimates also suggest that prices rise modestly in the
cash villages for the non-PAL goods. Note that for the cash transfer, unlike the in-kind
transfer, nothing distinguishes the PAL goods from other food items, so one would predict
similar price increases for both sets of goods.
4.5 Total pecuniary effects of the program
The estimated price effects for the PAL goods reported in Table 3 combined with the
results for non-PAL goods in Table 5 allow us to quantify the indirect transfer that occurs
through the pecuniary effects. We convert the percent changes in prices into the correspond-
ing indirect transfer, measured in pesos, for a consumer household; for example, a price
decrease is a positive transfer, the magnitude of which depends on the percent decline in
prices and on the amount households spend on the goods. We then compare the magnitude
of the indirect pecuniary transfers to the direct transfer provided by PAL.
We begin with the PAL goods. Expenditure on the items in the in-kind bundle was on
average 206 pesos per household per month in the control villages at follow-up. The value of
the in-kind bundle also happens to be 206 pesos. (For some of the PAL goods, e.g. powdered
milk and corn ﬂour, the households’ counterfactual consumption was less than the in-kind
transfer, so the transfer was extramarginal; for other goods, e.g. beans and vegetable oil, the
transfer was much less than counterfactual consumption and fully inframarginal. Summing
across the PAL goods, counterfactual consumption coincidentally has the same value as the
PAL bundle.) Thus, recipient households did not receive any additional pecuniary transfer
due to price changes for the PAL goods in the in-kind villages. Note that we exclude the
increase in demand induced by the transfer’s income effect when calculating the quantity to
which to apply the price change.
22The price changes affect all households, though, not just program recipients. Non-
recipient households spent 206 pesos a month on the food items contained in the PAL bundle,
andthe3.8percentpricedecreaseinin-kindvillages(Table3, column2)representsatransfer
of 7.8 pesos (206*.038) for every non-recipient household that is a pure consumer of these
items. For the cash transfers, our point estimate suggests that the price effect is equivalent to
a -1.3 peso transfer (206*.006) for each recipient or non-recipient consumer household.
The total pecuniary effect of the program also includes spillover effects on the prices of
non-PAL food items. Expenditure on the non-PAL items was 1096 pesos per month in the
control villages. The 0.8 percent price decrease for in-kind transfers (Table 5, column 4) is
thus equivalent to an 8.5 peso transfer to a consumer (program recipients and non-recipients
alike), and the 0.9 percent increase in prices in cash villages is equivalent to about a -10.2
peso transfer.
Combining the PAL and non-PAL goods, we ﬁnd that pecuniary effects decrease the
aggregate transfer size by 6.3 percent to a food consumer in the cash program. In other
words for every 100 pesos the government transfers, 6.3 pesos are offset for a consumer
because of inﬂation. Meanwhile, compared to the control group, pecuniary effects increase
the value of in-kind transfers for consumers by 5.2 percent. Thus, for the policy decision of
whether to provide transfers in kind or in cash, in-kind transfers deliver 11 percent more to
consumer households, based on our estimates. Conversely, for a net-producing household,
cash transfers deliver an extra pecuniary beneﬁt compared to in-kind transfers. There are of
course many other costs and beneﬁts of in-kind transfers that factor into the policy decision,
e.g. administrative costs and paternalistic objectives, but the pecuniary effects would appear
to be important in the decision, given their magnitude.
4.6 Remoteness of the village
We next turn to examining heterogeneity in the price effects based on the isolation of
the village. There are two reasons why the price effects might be ampliﬁed in more geo-
graphically remote villages. The ﬁrst is that these villages are more closed economies. In
the extreme of a perfectly open economy (horizontal supply curve), prices are exogenous to
the village, but if the local supply at least in part determines prices, then one expects that the
more disconnected the village is from other markets, the steeper the supply curve will be and
the more prices will adjust to supply or demand shocks (see Appendix Figure 2).
The second reason is that the supply side of the market is likely to be less competitive
in smaller, geographically remote villages. (There is a strong negative correlation between
23remoteness and village population in our sample.) In the standard oligopoly model, the less
competition there is, the more prices will respond to changes in the amount demanded from
local suppliers.
Using a measure of how geographically remote the village is, we test whether g1 < g2
and g2 > 0 in the following model.
lnpgsv = a +g1RemotenessvInKindv+g2RemotenessvCashv+
b1InKindv+b2Cashv+rRemotenessv+f lnpgv;t 1+sIgv+egsv (12)
Our measure of Remoteness is the time required to travel to a larger market that sells fruit,
vegetables, and meat. The measure captures the difﬁculty of transporting supply to the vil-
lage and therefore the village’s lack of integration with the outside economy. In addition,
remote villages are likely to have more market concentration (e.g., fewer shops selling gro-
ceries). Remoteness is constructed from household-survey self-reports on the travel time to
a medium-sized market. (See the Appendix for details on the construction of this variable.)
Table 6 reports the results on how the pecuniary effects vary with remoteness. Column 1
examines the basic PAL items. For the in-kind villages, the price effects are negative overall
and negative relative to the cash villages, though the interaction terms are insigniﬁcant. The
coefﬁcient difference (b g1   b g2) of -0.025 implies that for every extra hour of driving time,
prices fall by 2.5 percentage points more under in-kind transfers than under cash transfers.
The travel time to the market is likely correlated with other characteristics of the village.
For example, the more remote villages in our sample are also poorer. To partly address this
omitted variable problem, column 2 includes interaction terms (and the main effect) of the
median expenditure per capita in the village. Somewhat surprisingly, controlling for this
measure of the village’s income level makes the results stronger. The coefﬁcient difference
is -0.037 though still insigniﬁcant.
In columns 3 and 4, we examine all of the PAL goods and ﬁnd qualitatively similar
results. In this case, the in-kind-versus-cash effect (that is, the interaction with Remoteness)
is larger in magnitude and statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we repeat the speciﬁcations using the non-PAL goods. Note
that the predictions should hold equally strongly for PAL and non-PAL goods for the cash
villages since no good has special status, but for the in-kind villages, the predictions should
hold for non-PAL goods only insofar as they are substitutes for the PAL goods. We ﬁnd
24coefﬁcients with the predicted signs, but they are imprecisely estimated.
To summarize, we ﬁnd suggestive support for the hypothesis that the price effects of
transfers are larger in magnitude in villages that are more isolated from other villages and
towns.28 Because more remote areas also tend to be poorer, the results imply that pecuniary
effects will often be more pronounced in poorer areas. Thus, for transfer programs aimed at
the very poorest of communities, pecuniary effects are likely to be an important component
of the total welfare impact of the program. This point applies not just to Mexico, but to
developing countries broadly.29
Ideally, we would be able to distinguish whether the larger price effects in isolated vil-
lages are due to these areas having fewer grocery shops so less competition on the supply
side or to these villages being more closed economies. While both have the same implication
that price effects are larger in less developed areas, they have different efﬁciency implica-
tions. In addition, under the perfect-competition, closed-economy explanation, one expects
the supply curve to be ﬂatter in the long run and thus the price effects to dissipate, while the
imperfect competition explanation would predict more persistent effects. Unfortunately we
lack the data to distinguish these explanations; for example, data on the number of grocery
shops per village is not available.30 We therefore leave this question for future work.
4.7 Effects on producer households
Our last analysis examines effects on households engaged in agricultural production.
Households in the village are consumers of the packaged goods in the in-kind bundle, and
most are net consumers of food overall. However, many households produce some agri-
cultural products, and for their production the welfare implications of price changes are the
opposite of those for their consumption: A price increase (decrease) for food raises (lowers)
the value of their production. (Ideally, we would also examine effects on food store owners,
but the occupation variable in the survey is not speciﬁc enough to identify the store owners.)
We begin by examining how farm revenues and proﬁts in the past year vary by treatment
28Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant price effects of Progresa, consistent with price
effects being less pronounced in larger, more integrated communities.
29This point may also be relevant in developed countries. For example, in the U.S., inner cities are particu-
larly poor. Enrollment in transfer programs such as Food Stamps and WIC is high, and these neighborhoods
are often characterized as having few grocery stores (imperfect competition). If transportation costs to other
neighborhoods are high, then these markets are also relatively closed. These factors suggest that there could be
important pecuniary effects of transfer programs in these neighborhoods.
30According to program administrators, the number of stores in the price survey is not a good indicator of
the number of stores in the village and is more a reﬂection of how thorough the data collection was.
25type, estimating the following equation using household-level data:
FarmProductionhv = a +b1InKindv+b2Cashv+fFarmProductionhv;t 1+ehv: (13)
The subscript h indexes the household and, as before, v indexes the village. We cluster the
standard errors by village and, analogous to our earlier analyses, control for the pre-period
outcome variable.
As shown in column 1 of Table 7, we ﬁnd, as predicted, a positive coefﬁcient on Cash:
Farm revenues are higher in villages where households received cash transfers (and hence
where food prices rose) relative to control villages by 490 pesos. Similarly, we ﬁnd that farm
revenues are lower in in-kind villages relative to cash villages by 290 pesos. The effect of the
transfers on revenues appears to be due partly to the direct price change, holding quantities
ﬁxed, and also to adjustments in production. We do not have data on quantity produced,
only the monetary value of production, but the fact that proﬁts change by a smaller amount
than revenues (column 2) suggests that farmers expanded or contracted the quantity they
produced in response to the price changes. In other words, in cash villages, a farmer receives
higher revenues both because she earns more per unit sold and because she sells more units.
Of course, price effects are not the only reason that transfers might affect farm produc-
tion. If farmers are credit constrained, then the income effect of the program might lead to
more investment and increased production. Through this channel, for both the cash and in-
kind treatment, one expects an increase in farm revenues (and either an increase or decrease
in proﬁts depending on whether long-run investments were also made), though there is no
obvious reason that the credit-constraint channel would cause differential effects for cash
versus in-kind villages.
The results in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the PAL transfer program, through its pe-
cuniary effects, has different implications for producer households. To examine the overall
welfare effect of the program for different types of households, we ﬁrst classify households
as agricultural producers if, at baseline, they either own a farm or consume food from their
own production; 75 percent of households meet one of these two criteria. We then examine
the program impacts on total expenditures per capita, which serves as a proxy for household
26welfare and is meant to capture the total program effect for the household:
ExpendPChv = a +q1ProducerhInKindv+q2ProducerhvCashv
+b1InKindv+b2Cashv+rProducerhv+fExpendPChv;t 1+ehv(14)
The predictions are q1 <q2 and q2 >0; in-kind transfers compared to cash transfers are rela-
tively less beneﬁcial to producer households, and cash transfers are relatively more beneﬁcial
toproducerhouseholds. Whiletheresults(column3)areimprecise, theylineupwiththepre-
dictions that cash transfers are more valuable to producer households than to non-producer
households (by 8.7 percentage points), and in-kind transfers are relatively less valuable to
producer households than to non-producer households (by 8.6 percentage points). Also note
the main effect of Producer: Producer households are poorer than the non-producer house-
holds in our sample, so the fact that the cash program, relative to the in-kind program, helps
producer households more than non-producer households is a progressive effect.
Finally, in column 4 we examine a second measure of welfare, an asset index that mea-
sures how many of the following items the household owns: radio or TV, refrigerator, gas
stove, washing machine, VCR, car or motorcycle. Again, the point estimates suggest that
cash transfers are differentially beneﬁcial for producers (p-value=.06) and cash transfers,
relative to in-kind transfers, are more helpful for producers (p-value = .13). (We ﬁnd quali-
tatively similar estimates when we examine asset ownership for each asset type separately.)
To summarize, due to their different price effects, the welfare effects of cash versus in-kind
transfers appear to differ for producer households versus consumer households. That is,
cash transfers are more beneﬁcial to producers, while in-kind transfers are more beneﬁcial
to consumers.
5. Conclusion
As most of the world’s poor live in rural, often isolated villages, large welfare transfer
programs are likely to have quantitatively important price effects. This paper tests for price
effects of in-kind transfers versus cash transfers using the randomized design and panel data
collected for the evaluation of a large food assistance program for the poor in Mexico, the
Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL).
The price effects we ﬁnd are quite sizeable. The price increase caused by cash transfers,
based on the point estimates, offsets the direct transfer by 6 percent for recipients who are
27consumers of these goods. Meanwhile, for in-kind transfers, the price effects represent an
indirect beneﬁt to consumers equal to 5 percent of the direct beneﬁt. Thus, choosing in-kind
rather than cash transfers in this setting generates extra indirect transfers to the poor equal to
11 percent of the direct transfer. Of course, the welfare implications are reversed if transfers
recipients are producers rather than consumers.
We also ﬁnd that agricultural proﬁts increase in cash villages, where food prices rose,
more so than in in-kind villages where prices fell. These effects are due both to the change
in the price of goods sold, but also to households responding by producing more (less) when
the price of what they produce increases (decreases).
The fact that producer households adjust supply in response to the transfer program raises
the question of how long-lasting the price effects would be. It is likely that supply would
further adjust in the longer run, at least if there are no barriers to expansion or entry. We
leave the question of the long-run effects of the program for future work since the available
data do not allow for such an analysis.
Another key ﬁnding is that the price effects seem to be particularly pronounced for very
geographically isolated villages, where the most impoverished people live. This ﬁnding is
consistent with these villages being less open to trade and having less market competition.
While we cannot empirically test between these explanations, the fact that the price effects
persist a year after the program is in place is suggestive that imperfect competition may be at
play; even if marginal costs are ﬂat in the long run, with imperfect competition there would
be long-run price effects of in-kind transfers since the residual demand facing local suppliers
is lower. Note also that if there is imperfect competition, then when the government acts as
a supplier and provides in-kind transfers, it may not only be creating a pecuniary externality
in these villages but also reducing the inefﬁciency associated with imperfect competition.
The decision of whether to provide transfers in-kind or as cash includes many other
considerations besides price effects. For example, in-kind transfers constrain households’
choices, which has costs, but also might help policy makers achieve a paternalistic objective.
Another important consideration is how efﬁciently the government can provide supply. It
could still be the case that an uncompetitive private sector creates more surplus than if the
government were to enter as a supplier, if it would do so inefﬁciently. In that case, the
best way for the government to alleviate supply constraints in poor villages while providing
income support to households might be cash transfers combined with alternative supply-side
policies.
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A cash transfer shifts demand to the right from D to D0 for a normal good.











An in-kind transfer shifts demand from D to D0 and also shifts supply to the right by the amount of
new supply transferred to the economy, from S to S0.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corn flour basic 3 15.7 20% 1.00
Rice basic 2 12.7 12% 0.61
Beans basic 2 21.0 13% 0.29
Fortified powdered milk basic 1.92 76.2 17% 8.62
Packaged pasta soup basic 1.2 16.2 8% 0.93
Vegetable oil basic 1 (lt) 10.4 16% 0.25
Biscuits basic 1 18.7 8% 0.81
Lentils supplementary 1 10.3 2% 3.73
Canned tuna/sardines supplementary 0.6 14.8 2% 1.55


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(median village unit‐value) 2.39 2.37 2.37 0.44 0.41 0.81
(0.015) (0.013) (0.021)
Observations (village‐good level) 282 575 306
ln(median village unit‐value) 2.58 2.60 2.58 0.40 0.89 0.52
(0.017) (0.013) (0.019)
Observations (village‐good level) 423 863 459
ln(median village unit‐value) 2.68 2.70 2.68 0.46 0.82 0.28
(0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
Observations (village‐good level) 2799 5707 3064
Diconsa store in the village 0.26 0.45 0.39 0.03** 0.16 0.51
(0.071) (0.049) (0.068)
Travel time to nearest market (hours) 0.86 0.77 0.84 0.52 0.91 0.60
(0.114) (0.080) (0.110)
Observations (village level) 47 96 51
Monthly per capita expenditure (pesos) 570.48 535.06 529.51 0.31 0.26 0.85
(29.02) (18.89) (21.77)
Producer household 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.11 0.00*** 0.05*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Farm revenue (pesos) 480.85 760.23 980.51 0.06* 0.00*** 0.12
(121.56) (78.70) (119.01)
Farm profits (pesos) 118.43 176.40 212.84 0.31 0.13 0.42
(50.60) (24.89) (37.33)
Asset index 2.24 2.18 2.27 0.78 0.87 0.59
(0.16) (0.10) (0.13)
Indigenous household 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.66 0.39 0.56
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Household has a dirt floor 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.77 0.95 0.70
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Household has piped water 0.65 0.57 0.50 0.23 0.06 0.33
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
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37Table 6: Price effects as a function of the remoteness of the village
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Appendix A. Price effects with imperfect competition
Consider a simple Cournot-Nash model with N identical stores and indirect market de-
mand for a homogenous good, p(Q;X). Total demand is Q=åf qf =Nq where f =1;:::;N
indexes the store. Each store faces constant marginal costs, C = cq. We assume that the
demand curve is downward sloping, i.e.,
¶p
¶Q < 0.
Both an in-kind and cash injection can be represented by a shift in demand. A cash trans-
fer has only an income effect and is equivalent to a positive demand shift (for a normal good).
An in-kind transfer entails this income effect and an additional decrease in demand due to
the external inﬂux of goods; consumers receive some items for free from the government, so
they now demand less from local ﬁrms. In this model, such an exogenous change in demand
is represented by a change in the demand shifter X; where we deﬁne ¶Q
¶X > 0.
Stores maximize proﬁts with respect to quantities taking others’ behavior as given (Nash
equilibrium):
maxqP = p(Q)q cq:









where e   ¶Q
¶p
p
Q is the price-elasticity of demand.
The above equilibrium condition is useful for studying the effect of a shift in demand,
i.e. ¶X > 0, on the equilibrium price. For the class of demand functions that are additive in









since ¶g=¶p < 0 from the assumption of a downward-sloping demand curve. A simple
example in this class of demand curves is linear demand, e.g., Q = X  ap.
Thus, for any downward-sloping demand with an additive shifter, we can sign the price
effect of a demand shift. For demand functions in this class, a cash transfer will lead to
higher prices of normal goods and an in-kind transfer will lead to lower prices than a cash
transfer, just as in the case of perfect competition.
The price effect of a demand shift will in general be given by
dp




dX, and hence the sign of the price effects of transfer programs, will depend
on the sign of de
dX. For example, if transfers have a multiplicative effect on demand (e.g.,
Q = Xp a), there would be no price effects of transfers (
dp
dX = 0) since the elasticity of
demand is independent of X.
40Appendix B. Data appendix
Variable construction
Post-program prices
Post-program prices come from a survey of local stores; a maximum of three stores
were surveyed per village in each survey wave. Prices were collected in common units,
for example the price of a 150ml container of yogurt, a “small” loaf of bread, or a kilo of
corn ﬂour. For non-standard units, we converted prices to either kilos (for solids) or liters
(for liquids) using conversion factors supplied by the Mexican government for non-standard
units (e.g., a “small” loaf of bread weighs 0.68kg).
Pre-program prices
Pre-program prices are constructed as the village-median household unit value. House-
holds reported both expenditure and quantity purchased by good in a seven-day food recall
survey, and the household unit-value is deﬁned as the ratio of the two measures. For some
goods in some villages, there was no expenditure on a good by any household during the
seven-day recall period, and therefore the village-median unit-value for that good is missing.
In these cases, we impute the pre-program price using the median pre-program price in other
villages within the same municipality (or within the same state in the few cases where there
are no data for other villages in the municipality).
Presence of a Diconsa store
We identify the presence of a Diconsa store in experimental villages from the names of
stores that were surveyed for their prices, coding this variable by hand.
Supply measure
DSupply is a ratio that measures the size of the supply inﬂux of in-kind goods into
program villages, relative to what would have been consumed in the absence of the PAL
program. It is constructed as the average, across in-kind villages, of the village aggregate
amount of a good transferred to the village divided by the average consumption of the good
in control villages in the post-program period. Thus, DSupply varies only at the good level.
Remoteness measure
Travel Time is constructed from household self-reports on the time it takes to travel to
the nearest market where fresh fruit, vegetables, and meat are sold. Households were ﬁrst
asked if these fresh foods were sold in the village; then they were asked to state the time
to get to the nearest market, regardless of mode of transportation. Travel Time is thus the
village median among households that report leaving the village to purchase fresh foods.
Total household consumption
ExpendPC—monthly per capita expenditure—is constructed as the sum of monthly
household food expenditure, non-food expenditure, and expenditure on food away from
home, divided by the number of household members. Food expenditure is the value of food
consumed; consumption amounts were collected with a seven-day food recall module (con-
41verted to monthly amounts), covering 61 food items, and we use village median household
unit-values (imputed geographically if missing) to value consumption. Non-food expendi-
ture was reported at the monthly level and covers 26 categories designed to capture the extent
of non-durable, non-food expenditure (non-food consumption quantities were not collected).
Weekly expenditure on food away from home was self-reported by the household, and we
convert to monthly amounts. In some analyses, we use the median village monthly per capita
expenditure at baseline,Village Expenditure.
Farm production measures
We use two measures of Farm Production: farm revenues and farm proﬁts. Both mea-
sures are self-reports from the household surveys. Households were ﬁrst asked whether,
within the last year, any household member planted or reaped produce or grain, or raised
animals. If yes, they were asked the total costs involved in these activities and the how much
money was left over after these costs had been paid (i.e., farm proﬁts). We add costs to
proﬁts in order to construct farm revenues.
Producer household indicator
The variable Producer equals one if, at baseline, a household either auto-consumed their
production or owned a farm. Farm ownership was assumed if the household answered that,
within the last year, any household member had planted or reaped produce or grain, or raised
animals. Auto-consumption data was collected for 61 food items in a seven-day food recall
module. Household were asked to state the quantities consumed of each item, and how
much of that consumption was from own production (auto-consumption). If a household
auto-consumed any positive amount of at least one good, we also classify them as a producer.
Household asset index
We construct an index of the durable assets a household owns from self-reports in the
household questionnaire. Households were asked if they owned each of the following six
items: a radio or TV, a refrigerator, a gas stove, a washing machine, a VCR, and a car
or motorcycle. We sum the number of items the household reports owning to create the
variable Asset Index; thus, Asset Index ranges from zero to six.
Qualitative surveys of food stores
We conducted follow-up qualitative surveys of shopkeepers in 20 villages in the spring of
2011intheMexicanstatesofVeracruz, Oaxaca, andPuebla. ElevenofthevillageswerePAL
experimental villages and another ﬁve are currently PAL villages that were incorporated in
the program in the past two years. A research assistant interviewed several shopkeepers per
village (Diconsa and non-Diconsa) in these 16 villages. One of the coauthors (Jayachandran)
conducted similar interviews with shopkeepers in the other 4 villages, which were poor, rural
villages but not part of the PAL program.
Shopkeepers were asked how they procured supply, how they responded to unexpected
changes in demand, when they adjusted prices, whether prices varied by customer (i.e., price
discrimination), why they did not stock more inventory, and other questions related to the
market structure and pricing.








An in-kind transfer has two effects, an increase in the residual demand facing local suppliers due to an
income effect, and a decrease in residual demand because the government meets some of the demand
with its transfer. The net effect if that the marginal revenue curve shifts from MR to MRin kind. A
cash transfer has only the income effect, and the marginal revenue curve shifts to MRcash.












The more closed economy is depicted as having a steeper supply curve. Thus given the same demand
curve and the same-sized shift in supply, the price effects will be larger the more closed the economy.
44Appendix Figure 3: Villages in the PAL experiment
45Appendix Figure 4: Trucks transporting PAL boxes
46Appendix Figure 5: PAL box of food
Appendix Figure 6: Unloading PAL boxes in the village
47Appendix Figure 7: Grocery shops in PAL villages
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